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Abstract
The present study investigated skilled and adaptive strategy selection in risky decision making. We proposed that people
with high objective numeracy, a strong predictor of general decision making skill, would have a broad repertoire of choice
strategies and adaptively select these strategies depending on the importance of the decision. Thus more objectively numerate
people would maximize their effort (e.g., invest more time) in important, high-payoff decisions and switch to a simple, fast
heuristic strategy in trivial decisions. Subjective numeracy would, by contrast, be more closely related to interest in problem
solving for its own sake and would not yield such an effect of importance. Participants made twelve high-payoff choices and
twelve low-payoff choices in binary two-outcome gambles framed as gains. We measured objective and subjective numeracy
using standard measures. Results showed that people with high subjective numeracy generally maximized the expected value
(EV) in all decisions. In contrast, participants with high objective numeracy maximized EV only when choice problems were
meaningful (i.e., they could result in high payoffs). When choice problems were trivial (i.e., choosing the normatively better
option would not result in a large payoff), more objectively numerate participants made choices consistent with faster, more
frugal heuristic strategies.
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1 Introduction
In real-life financial situations, people use various choice
strategies and decision rules to deal with problems that in-
volve processing of outcomes and probabilities. For in-
stance, if we use the expected value (EV) maximization
principle as a model of rational behavior under risk, the
decision regarding whether or not to buy a lottery ticket for
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3 EUR with a probability of winning a one-million main
prize at 0.0000072%, should be preceded by optimization
analyses that include calculations comparing EV of the bet
(i.e., +0.072 EUR) with the certain loss of −3 EUR. How-
ever, comprehensive optimization is almost impossible in
the majority of everyday decision problems, as they are usu-
ally very complex, dynamic and uncertain (people do not
know every possible alternative, precise values of probabili-
ties, etc.). Furthermore, apart from material and accountable
consequences (e.g., money), people also attach value to other
resources such as their effort and time spent on making a de-
cision.
Many studies have reported that people with greater nu-
merical abilities are more likely to make better choices in
similar problems, that is, decisions more consistent with EV
maximization (Cokely et al., 2018; Pachur & Galesic, 2013;
Jasper, Bhattacharya, Levin, Jones & Bossard, 2013; Peters
& Bjalkebring, 2015). Nonetheless, there is compelling evi-
dence that superior decisions in more numerate people do not
simply result from complex computations of EVs but rather
they are driven by exhaustive considerations of multiple as-
pects of the problem (i.e., elaborate heuristic processing,
Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Ghazal, Cokely & Garcia-Retamero,
2014; Jasper, Bhattacharya & Corser, 2017). The ability to
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understand and use statistical and probability information)
is also related to superior decision making in both health
and financial domains (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011;
Garcia-Retamero, Andrade, Sharit & Ruiz, 2015; Ghazal et
al., 2014, 2014; Reyna & Brnst-Renck, 2014) and is associ-
ated with greater personal wealth in general (Estrada-Mejia,
de Vries & Zeelenberg, 2016). However, the question of how
people with high numeracy arrive at better decisions seems
to be complex.
Researchers argue that more (objectively) numerate indi-
viduals have better understanding of the gist of decisions
(Reyna, Nelson, Han & Dieckmann, 2009), deliberatively
employ metacognitive heuristics (Garcia-Retamero, Cokely
& Hoffrage, 2015; Ghazal et al., 2014), draw precise af-
fective meaning from numbers (Peters, 2012; Peters et al.,
2006), and are more likely to conduct explicit number op-
erations (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015). Higher numeracy
is also related to more exact mental number-line mapping
(Schley & Peters, 2014) and more linear transformations of
objective numbers (Millroth & Juslin, 2015), resulting in less
pronounced distortions in processing outcomes and proba-
bilities (Patalano, Saltiel, Machlin & Barth, 2015), although
other results raise questions about this conclusion (Peters
et al., 2006). Furthermore, people with higher objective
numeracy seem to be less prone to affective influences dur-
ing decision making (e.g., Petrova, van der Pligt & Garcia-
Retamero, 2014; Traczyk & Fulawka, 2016; Traczyk et al.,
2018).
A question posed here is whether those with higher objec-
tive numeracy are more inclined to adaptively change choice
strategy depending on the task requirements. Do they al-
locate their time and effort in proportion to the importance
of decisions? In particular, we investigated how the struc-
ture of the environment (operationalized as the difference
in the magnitudes of expected payoffs) influences strategy
selection under risk and what is the role of numeracy in this
process. The present study thus investigated whether highly
numerate individuals always engage more time and effort to
compute EV, or rather adaptively select their choice strategy
depending on the task and environment (Jasper et al., 2013).
Additionally, we examined the relative contribution of ob-
jective (i.e., inferred from the numerical task performance)
and subjective (i.e., declared preference for numbers and
number-related operations) numeracy in predicting choices.
Although a measure of subjective numeracy has been shown
to be a good proxy for objective numeracy (e.g., it pre-
dicts performance in numerical tasks; Fagerlin et al., 2007)
and some researchers use objective and subjective numer-
acy scales interchangeably (Zikmund-Fisher, Smith, Ubel &
Fagerlin, 2007), other studies have demonstrated that these
tests measure different traits (Anderson, Obrecht, Chapman,
Driscoll & Schulkin, 2011; Miron-Shatz, Hanoch, Doniger,
Omer & Ozanne, 2014; Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015; Petrova
et al., 2017). For instance, subjective numeracy predicts
perceptions of health, whereas objective numeracy predicts
actual health in patients (Garcia-Retamero et al. 2015). Tak-
ing this into account, in the present study we measured both
subjective and objective numeracy to examine their relative
contribution to choice.
1.1 Research problem and hypothesis
In this study, we ask whether people with high objective nu-
meracy adapt their effort to the importance of the decision,
or whether they simply make better decisions regardless of
the importance of the decision. On the one hand, more
numerate subjects are likely to make more normatively su-
perior choices in financial problems as a result of greater
deliberation during decision making (Ghazal et al., 2014).
This effect can be presumably attributed to the elaborative
heuristic search posited by Cokely and Kelley (2009) —
a larger number of simple considerations as well as better
understanding of formal operations with numbers. On the
other hand, more numerate subjects could also strategically
allocate deliberation time and use different choice strategies
depending on the importance of a decision, quantified here
by the EV ratio between gambles. That is, people high
in numeracy would maximize their effort (e.g., invest more
time and deliberation) when the decision really matters (i.e.,
when differences between expected payoffs are large), but
when the decision is trivial (i.e., when differences between
expected payoffs are small) they would switch to a simple
and fast heuristic strategy.
Prior research suggests two potential outcomes. Firstly,
in the case of trivial choice problems, more numerate indi-
viduals would behave similarly as in meaningful problems.
That is, they will deliberate more on the problem, leading to
more of their choices being consistent with EV (Ghazal et
al., 2014; Jasper et al., 2017). Secondly, because of the adap-
tive sensitivity to changes in EV that is exhibited by more
numerate people (Jasper et al., 2013), their ability to get the
gist of numbers (Reyna et al., 2009) and to employ heuristic
processing (Cokely & Kelley, 2009), they are expected to
switch to a faster heuristic-based strategy as it provides com-
parable performance in case of decisions that seem trivial
(i.e., low-payoff gambles with similar EVs).
2 Method
2.1 Subjects
One hundred and thirty-nine volunteers from the general
population (age range: 18–58 years; Mage = 29.21; SD =
8.57; 52% female) participated in an online study for a 30
PLN (Polish Zloty) compensation (equivalent to approxi-
mately 8 EUR).1 Subjects were recruited via an advertise-
1One hundred and thirty-three subjects completed all tasks.
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Table 1: Twelve low-payoff (with EV ratios around 1) and twelve high-payoff (with EV ratios between 5 and 6) binary choice
problems consisting of two-outcome gambles in the gain domain. The priority heuristic (PH) and cumulative prospect theory
(CPT) predicted opposite choices. Each problem met criteria of nondominance.








5.40, 0.29; 0, 0.71 9.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 1.57 1.65 1.05 A B
17.50, 0.17; 0, 0.83 3.00, 0.94; 0, 0.06 2.98 2.82 1.05 B A
9.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 5.40, 0.29; 0, 0.71 1.65 1.57 1.05 B A
3.00, 0.29; 0, 0.71 5.40, 0.17; 0, 0.83 0.87 0.92 1.06 A B
31.50, 0.17; 0, 0.83 5.40, 0.94; 0, 0.06 5.36 5.08 1.05 B A
31.50, 0.29; 0, 0.71 56.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 9.14 9.64 1.06 A B
9.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 3.00, 0.52; 0, 0.48 1.65 1.56 1.06 B A
5.40, 0.17; 0, 0.83 3.00, 0.29; 0, 0.71 0.92 0.87 1.06 B A
3.00, 0.52; 0, 0.48 9.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 1.56 1.65 1.06 A B
17.50, 0.52; 0, 0.48 56.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 9.1 9.64 1.06 A B
9.70, 0.52; 0, 0.48 31.50, 0.17; 0, 0.83 5.04 5.36 1.06 A B
56.70, 0.17; 0, 0.83 17.50, 0.52; 0, 0.48 9.64 9.1 1.06 B A
3.00, 0.17; 0, 0.83 56.70, 0.05; 0, 0.95 0.51 2.84 5.56 A B
3.00, 0.94; 0, 0.06 31.50, 0.52; 0, 0.48 2.82 16.38 5.81 A B
56.70, 0.05; 0, 0.95 3.00, 0.17; 0, 0.83 2.84 0.51 5.56 B A
5.40, 0.94; 0, 0.06 56.70, 0.52; 0, 0.48 5.08 29.48 5.81 A B
31.50, 0.52; 0, 0.48 3.00, 0.94; 0, 0.06 16.38 2.82 5.81 B A
56.70, 0.52; 0, 0.48 5.40, 0.94; 0, 0.06 29.48 5.08 5.81 B A
3.00, 0.94; 0, 0.06 56.70, 0.29; 0, 0.71 2.82 16.44 5.83 A B
5.40, 0.52; 0, 0.48 56.70, 0.29; 0, 0.71 2.81 16.44 5.86 A B
31.50, 0.29; 0, 0.71 3.00, 0.52; 0, 0.48 9.14 1.56 5.86 B A
56.70, 0.29; 0, 0.71 5.40, 0.52; 0, 0.48 16.44 2.81 5.86 B A
3.00, 0.29; 0, 0.71 56.70, 0.09; 0, 0.91 0.87 5.1 5.87 A B
56.70, 0.09; 0, 0.91 3.00, 0.29; 0, 0.71 5.1 0.87 5.87 B A
CPT and EV were always consistent in their choice predictions in these problems.
ment published on a local webpage. Subjects received ex-
plicit information stating that the study examined cognitive
abilities and were assured that payment was not related to
their performance. Volunteers gave informed consent before
the study.
2.2 Design and materials
The study was designed to investigate the relationship be-
tween numeracy and choices under risk. We measured both
subjective and objective numeracy as main predictors in this
study as well as fluid intelligence and need for cognition.
We also introduced a within-subjects manipulation of choice
payoff (i.e., 12 low-payoff vs. 12 high-payoff binary two-
outcome choice problems). The dependent variable was
subjects’ choices in these problems. Response latencies in
each problem were used to operationalize deliberation time
and enhance our understanding of the cognitive processes
underlying decision making.
Subjects completed the following measures:
2.2.1 The Berlin Numeracy Test
The Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT; Cokely, Galesic, Schulz,
Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012) is a psychometric instru-
ment that measures statistical numeracy, risk literacy and
comprehension of the concept of probability. The BNT is
widely used as an efficient research tool to measure objec-
tive numerical abilities (Cokely et al., 2012). In the current
study, we used a computerized version of the BNT consisting
of four items presented to subjects in a fixed order. Subjects
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Table 2: An example of cognitive operations and choice predictions according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and
priority heuristic (PH).
Gamble A: 29% probability to
win 5.40 EUR or 71% probability
to win nothing (0 EUR)
Gamble B: 17% probability to
win 9.70 EUR or 83% probability
to win nothing (0 EUR)
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT)
Step 1: compute the CPT value of a gamble Using equation V =
n∑
i=1
w (pi) v (xi), where w is the decision weight for
probability pi , and v is a value of an outcome xi with standard CPT
parameters (0.88 for the value function and 0.61 for the probability
weighting function in gain domain), CPT values for Gamble A and B
equal 1.38 and 1.78, respectively.
Decision: select the gamble with a higher CPT
value
Select Gamble B because of the higher CPT value.
Priority heuristic (PH)
Step 1: is the difference in minimum gains larger
than 10% of minimum gain?
No. Minimum gain in Gamble A (0 EUR) equals to the minimum gain
in Gamble B (0 EUR)
Step 2: is the difference in the probability of the
minimum gain larger than 10% in the probability
scale?
Yes. 71% in Gamble A vs. 83% in Gamble B (the difference of 12% is
larger than 10%). Thus, considering the last step posited by PH (i.e., the
difference between maximum gains) is not necessary.
Decision: stop the process and select the gamble
with a lower probability of minimum gain
Select Gamble A.
CPT and EV were always consistent in their choice predictions in these problems.
were not forced to provide any response to complete the
items.
2.2.2 The Subjective Numeracy Scale
Subjects completed the Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS;
Fagerlin et al., 2007), an 8-item self-assessment scale that
measures subjective numeracy and includes two subscales
referring to perceived numerical abilities (e.g., “How good
are you at working with percentages?”) and preference for
numerical and statistical information (e.g., “How often do
you find numerical information to be useful?”). Subjects
completed the SNS by answering each question using a 6-
point scale.
2.2.3 The Need for Cognition Scale
Individual differences in epistemic motivation were assessed
using the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo & Petty,
1982). The Polish adaptation of the scale (Matusz, Traczyk
& Gąsiorowska, 2011) includes 36 items and measures "the
tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking"
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). The main goal of the
NCS is to assess the individual’s level of joy and satisfaction
emerging from the processes of thinking, resolving prob-
lems, learning new things, etc. Subjects used a 5-point scale
to indicate the extent they agree with each statement (e.g.,
“Thinking is not my idea of fun”).
2.2.4 The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices
To measure individual differences in fluid intelligence
we used the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices test
(RAPM; Raven, 2000). The RAPM is a nonverbal test that
is typically employed to assess basic cognitive functioning
such as abstract reasoning. Problems included in this test are
presented in the form of matrices (e.g., 3 x 3 elements) with
one missing piece. The task is to figure out the rule underly-
ing the uncovered elements and select the missing element
that satisfies the appropriate rule. In the present study, we
used a short form of the RAPM consisting of two training
and six test matrices displayed with ascending difficulty.
2.2.5 Choice problems
We used twenty-four binary choice problems consisting of
two-outcome gambles from a study by Pachur, Hertwig,
Gigerenzer and Brandstätter (2013, Experiment 2). The out-
comes of the choice problems were framed as gains. Choice
problems differed in their EV ratios (Table 1), which we used
to define high- and low-payoff problems. If the EVs of two
gambles were similar (dividing their EVs led to outcomes
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around 1), then we classified them as low-payoff problems in
comparison to high-payoff problems in which the EVs of the
two gambles differed substantially (dividing their EVs led
to outcomes between 5 and 6). In other words, low-payoff
problems (with EVs ratios around 1) can be regarded as triv-
ial, because playing them repeatedly would lead to relatively
small differences in payoffs irrespective of the chosen gam-
ble (i.e., it does not really matter which option you should
select, because in the long-run a decision maker would get
a similar payoff). In contrast, high-payoff problems (with
EVs ratios between 5 and 6) are more meaningful, because
their EVs differ and choosing the gamble with the higher EV
will lead to much higher payoffs (i.e., it pays to choose the
gamble with higher EV because differences in payoffs are
large in the long run).
The problems were generated in such a way that two com-
peting models of choice under risk — the priority heuristic
(PH; Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 2006) and cumu-
lative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992)
— always led to different predictions on choice. Accord-
ing to CPT, a decision-maker multiplicatively combines the
subjectively transformed outcomes and their weighed prob-
abilities to arrive at an overall value of a gamble. Next, a
gamble with a higher value is chosen. In contrast, the PH
posits that a decision maker relies on a series of sequential
steps aimed at comparing gambles according to their mini-
mum gains, the probabilities of these minimum gains, and
the maximum gains (in fixed order). The sequence of com-
parative operations is stopped resulting in a choice when the
difference between minimum (maximum) gains is larger than
10% of the minimum (maximum) gain, or if the difference
in probabilities of minimum gains is larger than 10% of the
probability scale (Table 2).
Let us illustrate the difference between CPT and PH in the
following two gambles presented in the first row of Table 1,
(Gamble A: 5.40, 0.29; 0, 0.71 and Gamble B: 9.70, 0.17; 0,
0.83). PH predicts that a decision maker will choose Gamble
A because the difference in minimum gain probabilities is
larger than 10% of the probability scale (i.e., 0.71 vs. 0.83).
In contrast, CPT with standard parameters from Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) predicts that a decision maker will choose
Gamble B because of its greater CPT value (i.e., 1.38 vs.
1.78).
The choice of CPT and PH for assessing the gambles
is not meant to imply that subjects conform to either the-
ory. Rather it was intended to reflect the difference between
simple heuristics and more compensatory approaches to de-
cision making. In general, we expect CPT predictions to be
the same as EV predictions.
2.3 Procedure
Subjects were instructed that they should complete the pro-
cedure individually during one session. Subjects also con-





























Figure 1: Proportion of choices consistent with expected
value (CPT/EV) as a function of payoff (high/low, dashed lines
are high) and numeracy (subjective in dark blue, objective in
orange). Subjective numeracy (SNS) scores are displayed in
quintiles (as equal as possible), so that the number of sub-
jects in each point — represented by the area of each point
— are roughly comparable to those for objective numeracy.
firmed that they would focus on the task at hand and turn off
other applications/music that could distract their attention.
In reference to the BNT they were informed that they were
not allowed to use calculators, but they could take notes on
paper.
Tasks were administered with the InquisitWeb (2016) soft-
ware and ran in pseudorandom order. Text was displayed in
a black font on a light gray background. All subjects started
by reading instructions and completing a demographic sur-
vey. They then completed a block of tasks including the
BNT, RAPM, and choice problems (presented in random
order), followed by another block which included the self-
report measures of SNS and NCS (also presented in random
order). Additionally, twelve low- and twelve high-payoff
choice problems were mixed and presented to each subject
in a different random order. At the end of the study, subjects
declared whether we could include their data in the analy-
ses. The entire procedure took approximately 40 minutes
(although there were no time constraints). There was no
immediate feedback regarding performance. However, af-
ter the study, subjects received information on their results
in comparison to average scores calculated from the study
sample.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for measures used in the study. BNT – the Berlin Numeracy Test, NCS – the Need for Cognition
Scale, RAPM – the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices, SNS – the Subjective Numeracy Scale. CPT/EV-consistent
choices in low- and high-payoff problems refer to the number of expected value choices in these problems.




Mean 1.75 34.87 3.71 131.9 8.8 4.41
SEM 0.11 0.67 0.13 1.66 0.27 0.27
Median 2 36 4 133 10 4
SD 1.27 7.88 1.48 19.38 3.17 3.15
Minimum 0 11 0 75 0 0
Maximum 4 48 6 171 12 11
N 139 139 136 136 138 138
Table 4: Pearson zero-order correlation coefficients for the relationships between measures used in the study. CPT/EV-
consistent choices in low- and high-payoff problems refer to the number of expected value choices in these problems. BNT –
the Berlin Numeracy Test, NCS – the Need for Cognition Scale, RAPM – the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices, SNS
– the Subjective Numeracy Scale. Deliberation time is log-transformed median choice latency.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. BNT . .503∗∗∗ .529∗∗∗ .214∗ .344∗∗∗ .281∗∗∗ −.085 .301∗∗∗
2. SNS . .372∗∗∗ .428∗∗∗ .315∗∗∗ .196∗ .200∗ .323∗∗∗
3. RAPM . .238∗∗ .178∗ .121 −.077 .241∗∗
4. NCS . .237∗∗ .163 .182∗ .137
5. Deliberation time in low-payoff problems (log) . .807∗∗∗ .144 .519∗∗∗
6. Deliberation time in high-payoff problems (log) . −.106 .389∗∗∗
7. CPT/EV choices in low-payoff problems . .340∗∗∗
8. CPT/EV choices in high-payoff problems .
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
3 Results
Descriptive statistics for the measures used in the study and
the correlations between them are presented in Table 3 and
Table 4 respectively. Higher scores in the BNT, SNS, and
RAPM as well as longer deliberation time were correlated
with more choices consistent with CPT/EV in high-payoff
problems. In low-payoff problems, only SNS and NCS, but
not BNT or RAPM were positively correlated with CPT/EV-
consistent choices. Of interest is the large difference between
objective and subjective numeracy in predicting choices in
low-payoff problems. In high-payoff problems, both ob-
jective and subjective numeracy strongly predicted CPT/EV
choices, explaining almost twice as much variance as RAPM
or NCS.
Figure 1 shows the different roles of subjective and objec-
tive numeracy by plotting a proportion of CPT/EV choices
as a function of numeracy for high- and low-payoff condi-
tions, for both subjective and objective numeracy. Note that
the CPT/EV choice proportion increases with subjective nu-
meracy for both payoff conditions, but the choice proportion
increases with objective numeracy only for the high-payoff
condition. Thus, higher objective numeracy (BNT) appears
to lead to greater sensitivity to payoffs (greater difference
between top and bottom lines in Figure 1).
To ask whether subjective and objective numeracy predict
different aspects of performance, we calculated the mean
proportion of CPT/EV-consistent choices for each subject
and the difference between high- and low-payoff conditions
in CPT/EV-consistent choices, to assess sensitivity to payoff.
Next, we asked whether these two components, CPT/EV
choices and payoff sensitivity, were differentially affected
by measures of individual differences used in the study. To
do this, we used canonical correlation (fit by the R package
yacca: Butts, 2012). The idea is to find a linear combination
of the “X” variables (BNT, SNS, RAPM, NCS) that corre-
late with a linear combination of the “Y” variables (CPT/EV
choices and payoff sensitivity), optimizing the weights for the
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Table 5: Loadings on canonical variates (pairs of linear com-







Y’s with four X’s
CPT/EV choices 0.23 0.97




Y’s with two X’s
CPT/EV choices 0.61 0.79
Payoff sensitivity 0.79 −0.61
two combinations so as to get the highest correlation. Then
(in essence) repeat the process on the residuals, to see if a
different pattern of weights can account for additional vari-
ance (here we can have only two of these canonical variates
because we have only two Y variables). Table 5 shows the
loadings (analogous to factor loadings) on the two canonical
variates.
The top half of Table 5 shows the weights for all four X
variables. The two objective X variables (BNT and RAPM)
load mostly on CV1, which is most strongly related to Payoff-
sensitivity, while the two subjective X variables (SNS and
NCS) load on CV2, which is related to CPT/EV choices.
The bottom half shows similar results using only the two nu-
meracy measures as X variables. For both of these analyses
(with four and two X variables), the second canonical vari-
ate was significant (p = .0024 and p = .0004, respectively,
by Bartlett’s χ2 test), indicating that the second canonical
variate accounted for significant variance. Thus, the results
cannot be explained in terms of a single underlying factor
affecting all X and Y variables.
Finally, we investigated the relationships among payoff,
choices and response times. Log response times were slower
for the low-payoff condition, presumably because the deci-
sion was more difficult, and slower for the choice of the
better option (CPT/EV-consistent choice), presumably be-
cause the choice was made after more thought. The latter
effect was greater in the low-payoff condition.2 Means (in
2These effects were tested with a multi-level model with subjects and
choices as crossed random effects. All effects, including the interaction,
msec, derived from the mean logs) were: 3631 for high pay-
off, CPT/EV choice; 3280 for high payoff, PH choice; 6542
for low payoff, CPT/EV choice; and 3364 for low payoff, PH
choice. Mean log response times increased with both BNT
(r = .32, p < .001) and SNS (r = .25, p = .003), but the
two measures of numeracy did not differ significantly in any
analysis, and, if anything, show effects opposite to those that
might be expected given other results. Likewise, the two
correlations did not differ for just the low-payoff condition
(r = .33, p < .001 for BNT, r = .30, p = .001 for SNS;
calculated with logs taken before averaging).
4 Discussion
In the present study, we demonstrated that more statistically
numerate decision makers are able to strategically invest
sufficient deliberation to make adaptive choices. When de-
cisions really mattered and could result in high payoffs, peo-
ple with high objective numeracy made normatively better
choices predicted by CPT and EV. However, when decisions
were trivial and did not matter because the payoffs of the
available options were similar, those with high objective nu-
meracy made choices predicted by a heuristic strategy (i.e.,
PH). These PH-consistent choices were also “better”, be-
cause they resulted in getting an equally good payoff without
wasting additional time and effort that could be of more value
than the negligible difference in payoff earned by selecting
the CPT/EV-consistent option.
At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive that those with
high objective numeracy did not always maximize EV. How-
ever, after deeper consideration, we can conclude that deci-
sion makers with high objective numeracy exhibited adap-
tive rationality as they tried to maximize payoffs when choice
problems were meaningful and, at the same time, minimized
effort when choice problems were trivial. What is a potential
cognitive mechanism underlying these effects?
Accordingly, our findings are a straightforward demonstra-
tion that more numerate subjects adaptively selected their
choice strategy on more important choices. Nevertheless,
it is not clear whether they performed EV-like computa-
tions (i.e., multiplying outcomes and probabilities) or rather
used sophisticated heuristic processing (i.e., transforming
and comparing probabilities and outcomes, reframing the
problem, and so forth). Although the choice problems we
used in our study clearly distinguish between two choice
models, the lack of more sophisticated process-tracing mea-
sures (e.g., eye tracking) does not allow us to conclude
that subjects processed gambles accordingly. For instance,
Cokely and Kelley (2009) demonstrated that choices con-
sistent with EV rarely resulted from EV computations but
had 95% confidence intervals that excluded zero. The use of such a model
was necessary because subjects differed in the number of choices of the
better option in the two payoff conditions, so that choice and payoff were
not orthogonal.
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they were driven by elaborative heuristic processing instead.
Moreover, Pachur et al. (2013) also demonstrated that us-
ing simple heuristics (e.g., the equiprobable heuristic, the
equal-weight heuristic, or the better-than-average heuristic,
Brandstätter et al., 2006) can lead to the same choices as
those predicted by CPT or EV models. Indeed, Pachur et
al. (2013) documented that these trade-off heuristics rev-
eled the same performance as CPT in problems with both
similar and different EV ratios, but at the same time lead to
the opposite predictions to PH. Therefore, different cognitive
processes from those posited by CPT/EV can be responsible
for CPT/EV-consistent choices. This research problem can
be addressed in future studies using process-tracing mea-
sures like think-aloud protocols or Mouselab-type methods
in order to reveal the underlying cognitive process.
4.1 The role of subjective and objective nu-
meracy
Apart from a measure of objective numeracy, we also used
scales measuring subjective numeracy as well as need for
cognition and fluid intelligence. These measures were re-
lated to choices. In particular, SNS was associated with
more CPT/EV choices in both low and high payoff prob-
lems. NCS correlated with choices in low-payoff problems,
and RAPM was positively related to more choices that max-
imized EV in high-payoff problems. While objective nu-
meracy was a marker of adaptive strategy selection, SNS
was a persistent marker of CPT/EV choices. These results
are in line with recent advances in numeracy theory and
they show that objective and subjective numeracy (although
often used interchangeably) map different numerical com-
petencies, consequently eliciting different implications for
decisions (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015). Objective numer-
acy has been more strongly linked to number comparisons,
operations, and calculations. Subjective numeracy, on the
other hand, has been primarily linked to emotional reactions
to numbers, preference for them as well as motivation and
confidence in numeric tasks (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015).
This differentiation allows for qualitatively different predic-
tions for subjective and objective numeracy that can help
understand the role of these constructs in risky choices.
In light of our findings, it seems that objective numeracy
is a marker of adaptive and meta-cognitive strategy selection
related to numerical processing. Consistent with previous
research (Ghazal et al., 2014; Petrova, Garcia-Retamero,
Catena & van der Pligt, 2016), subjects with higher objective
numeracy spent more time deliberating on problems, but
they were also able to switch to a faster strategy when choice
problems became more trivial (i.e., the differences in payoffs
were small).
Higher subjective numeracy was related to EV maximiza-
tion processes irrespectively of the problem payoff. Sub-
jective numeracy may, in a sense, indicate additional utility
from trying to solve a problem. If so, subjects with high
subjective numeracy would be less sensitive to the lack of
extrinsic reward. They may have simply found the task inter-
esting enough so that they tried to find the best option even
when it was clear that the two options did not differ much in
their expected outcomes.
4.2 Conclusions
To summarize, we demonstrated that subjective and objective
numeracy play different roles in choices under risk. While
people with high subjective numeracy tried to maximize ev-
ery decision irrespectively of its payoff, objectively numer-
ate, skilled decision makers did not waste extra time thinking
harder and longer about trivial problems. Importantly, these
people were able to assess which problem is meaningful and
adapt their choice strategy to maximize payoff.
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